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We develop a model of internal governance where the self-serving actions of top management are
limited by the potential reaction of subordinates.  Internal governance can mitigate agency problems
and ensure that firms have substantial value, even with little or no external governance by investors.
Internal governance works best when both top management and subordinates are important in generating
cash flow.  External governance, even if crude and uninformed, can complement internal governance
and improve efficiency.  This leads to a theory of investment and dividend policy, where dividends
are paid by self-interested CEOs to maintain a balance between internal and external control.  Our
paper can explain why firms with limited external oversight, and firms in countries with poor external
governance, can have substantial value.
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 The Internal Governance of Firms  




A public corporation is commonly viewed as an organization run by CEOs and monitored by a 
board of directors on behalf of public shareholders.  This view separates decision management 
(by the CEO and other managers) from decision control (by the board) and from investment and 
risk-bearing (by public shareholders).  This governance structure is viewed as reasonable and 
efficient (Fama and Jensen (1983a, b) and Jensen (2000)), provided that decisions are made to 
maximize the value of shareholders’ residual claim.  Many public corporations thrive in this 
governance structure.  
Yet the clear evidence that public corporations “work” has to be set against the equally 
clear evidence that most shareholders have little control over boards (Monks (2007)) and that 
many boards treat CEOs generously (Bebchuk and Fried (2004)).  CEOs are self interested, not 
automatically faithful servants of the shareholders (see, for example, Jensen (1986, 1993), Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1990) and Shleifer and Vishny (1989, 1997)).  The market for corporate 
control can provide some discipline, but it is hard to see it as effective in controlling operational 
decisions.  How then do we reconcile the survival and apparent efficiency of the public 
corporation with the weak channels through which it is supposedly governed?      
  We argue that there are important stakeholders in the firm, particularly its junior 
managers, who care about its future even if the CEO acts in his or her short-term self interest and 
shareholders are dispersed and powerless.  These stakeholders, because of their power to 
withdraw their contributions to the firm, can force the CEO to act in a more public-spirited and 
far-sighted way.  We call this process internal governance.  
                                                 
2 J. W. Lorsch and T. J. Tierney (2002), Aligning the Stars: How to Succeed when Professionals Drive 
Results.  Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, p. 64. 
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  The main departure of this paper from most of the existing literature is to see the firm as a 
composition of diverse agents with different horizons, different interests and different 
opportunities for misappropriation and growth.  To fix ideas, think of a partnership run by an old 
CEO who is about to retire.  The CEO has a young manager working under him who will be the 
future CEO.  (We could just as well think of two young managers, each with a 50% chance of 
promotion, or four with a 25% chance, etc.)  Three ingredients go into producing the firm’s cash 
flow: the firm’s capital stock; the CEO’s ability to manage the firm, based on his skill and firm-
specific knowledge, and the young manager’s effort, which allows her to learn and prepare for 
promotion.  
  We assume the CEO can commit to an investment plan, which means the CEO will leave 
behind a pre-determined amount of capital stock.  The CEO can appropriate everything else:  he 
can tunnel cash out of the firm, consume perks, or convert cash to leisure by shirking. The CEO 
cannot directly commit future CEOs to any course of action.  
Because the CEO has a short horizon, he could simply decide to take all of the cash flow, 
investing nothing for the future.  But he needs the young manager’s effort in order to generate the 
cash flow.  If the manager sees that the CEO will leave nothing behind, she has scant incentive to 
exert effort, and cash flow falls significantly.  To forestall this, the CEO commits to investing 
some fraction of current cash flow, building or enhancing the firm’s capital stock in order to 
create a future for his young employee, thereby motivating her.
3   This allows the firm to build 
substantial value, despite being led by a sequence of myopic and rapacious CEOs.
4
                                                 
3 It is hard to write contracts that specify future investment, since both the quantity and quality of 
investment should depend on the arrival of opportunities, on forecasted business conditions and on the 
CEO’s business judgment, which are nearly impossible to measure or verify.  Managerial learning effort is 
equally hard to contract on, though it can be rewarded ex post through promotion (Prendergast (1993)). 
However, we do not require explicit contracting here.  All we need is some mechanism to make investment 
visible and credible to the junior manager.  
 
4 While our CEO is myopic and self-interested, in reduced form he acts as if he cares about his subordinates 
and the survival of the firm.  Donaldson and Lorsch (1983) conclude from interviews that continuity of the 
firm is CEOs’ primary objective.  Donaldson (1985) describes top management’s objective as maximizing 
corporate wealth, not shareholder value.  Of course, most CEOs are not the caricatures that economic 3 
 
We show that internal governance is most effective when both the CEO and the manager 
contribute to the firm’s cash flows.  If the CEO’s contributions dominate, he has no desire to limit 
his capture of cash flow in order to provide incentives for the manager.  If the manager’s 
contributions dominate, she has little incentive to learn, because she cannot capture value today, 
and learning will be of little use when she does become the CEO.  Also, both current and future 
profit opportunities matter for incentives, so internal governance works best when the business 
environment is stable.   
We extend the basic model by allowing the CEO to commit to sell the firm to the 
manager when he retires. We show that this extends the horizon of the CEO so much that the first 
best level of capital investment is reached, given managerial effort. We call this the rolling 
partnership and it essentially reduces the agency problem at the firm down to the problem of 
incentivizing managerial effort. Of course, in a variety of situations, the manager is likely to be 
wealth constrained so that she cannot buy the firm from the CEO, and therefore the rolling 
partnership will not be feasible. We turn next to how outside equity can help replicate some of the 
effects of selling the firm on CEO incentives.  We show that a combination of internal 
governance and a rudimentary form of outside governance by shareholders can improve the 
efficiency of the firm dramatically. 
  Suppose the firm is a public corporation.  Following Fluck (1998) and Myers (2000), we 
assume that shareholders have only the crude but basic property right to take over the firm and its 
capital stock, firing the CEO if necessary.  We assume that the capital stock would retain its best 
alternative value in the hands of the investors.  In equilibrium, shareholders do not intervene, 
because the CEO delivers just enough value to the shareholders to keep them at bay.  Value is 
delivered by paying out cash dividends or by investing cash to increase the capital stock, with a 
larger capital stock increasing the value of investors’ claim. 
                                                                                                                                                 
models like ours make them out to be, yet it is reassuring that even though we imbue them with no 
redeeming qualities, our model still has them investing for the future.  
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Outside equity thus has no direct control over investment or effort decisions – it has no 
operational influence. Even so, it can greatly enhance investment by the CEO and the value of the 
firm. Intuitively, the ability to issue outside equity allows the CEO to pledge the cash flow 
generated by future generations of CEOs to outside capital. This gives him the incentive to invest 
more, essentially by forcing future generations of CEOs to pay for the investment he makes. It 
can be shown that the steady state level of capital stock can be greater or less than the first best 
level, given managerial effort. But it certainly is greater than in our base case where the CEO 
cannot sell the firm to his manager. 
We also obtain a theory of dividend policy. Shareholders do not care whether they are 
paid in cash or by increases in the firm’s capital stock, which allow them to extract more payment 
in the future.  For the CEO, the dollar paid out as dividends and the dollar left behind as 
investment costs the same, but initially the CEO prefers to pay by investing, which has the 
additional effect of motivating greater effort by the manager. With decreasing returns to 
investment, the rate of return falls, and eventually the CEO makes the manager worse off by 
investing more. Intuitively, additional investment increases cash flows in the next period, when 
the manager will be CEO.  But the increased capital stock also increases shareholders’ claim on 
the firm. When cash returns generated by investment are low, the latter effect may dominate the 
former effect.  The current CEO will switch to paying dividends, not because shareholders prefer 
dividends to capital gains, but because more investment will reduce the rents going to the 
manager below her participation constraint.  This then gives us a dividend policy that follows the 
life cycle of a firm.  No dividends are paid when the firm is young and investment profitable, but 
dividends commence when the firm is mature.  
More generally, the firm starts paying out when additional investment would impose too 
heavy a future burden on employees to meet the expectations of claimholders. We find that this 
combination of internal and external governance can encourage greater investment and longer 5 
 
CEO horizons than if there was only external governance while eliminating the rents that would 
be extracted by top management if there was purely internal governance.   
We offer these models to make a general point: The traditional description of the firm 
falls short on three counts.  First, control need not be exerted just top down, or from outside; it 
can also be asserted bottom-up.  The CEO has to give his subordinates a reason to follow, and 
that, implicitly, is how they control him.  Second, the view that there is one residual claimant in 
the firm, the shareholder, is too narrow.  Anyone who shares in the quasi-rents generated by the 
firm has some residual claims, and thus there is no easy equivalence between maximizing 
shareholder value and maximizing efficiency.  Third, the fact that CEOs and managers get rents 
at different horizons means that each one has to pay attention to others’ residual claims in order to 
elicit co-operation.  The checks that parties inside the firm impose on each other ensure the firm 
functions well, even if outside governance is weak.     
  The rest of the paper is as follows. In section I, we present a simple model of internal 
governance.  We solve it and analyze different outcomes.  Section II extends the benchmark 
model to rolling partnerships.  Section III explores external governance by public shareholders.  
Section IV discusses how our results relate to prior literature.  Section V concludes. 
I. The model 
 
Consider a firm with a two-level managerial hierarchy.  Each agent can work, at most, for two 
periods. At the top of the hierarchy is a CEO who is old.  In the second layer is a young manager 
who will become CEO next period.  We start with no outside investors, so it’s best for now to 
think of the firm as employee-owned, a rolling partnership of managers and CEOS.  
At the beginning of each period t, the current CEO commits to invest part of the period’s 
cash flow.  This determines the end-of-period capital stock  t k .
5
                                                 
5 So at the beginning of period t+1, the capital stock 
   The CEO backs up his 
t k is verifiable by the junior manager.  But a new 
CEO can appropriate both capital stock and cash flows -- in other words, he can “tunnel” out both assets 6 
 
commitment with internal audit and accounting procedures sufficient to convince the manager 
that past investments will not be tunneled out of the firm and that the new investment will in fact 
be made.  More comprehensive procedures allow more of cash flows and past investment to be 
“ring-fenced,” ensuring the CEO cannot appropriate them.
6
t s
  The manager then decides how much 
she will engage in firm-specific learning effort  at a cost of  t s .  Her effort contributes to the 
current period’s cash flow Ct.  At the end of the period, the CEO walks off with all of the cash or 
capital that was not ring-fenced for investment. The timeline of the model is given by Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Model timeline 
Period t                                Period t+1… 






t k  
(3) Manager 
engages in  
learning effort 












1.1. Learning by doing 
  Firm-specific learning is important for a manager to be effective.  Learning by doing 
helps generate business and cash inflows when the manager is young.  It is thus a form of effort, 
and we will use the terms “learning” and “effort” interchangeably.  Learning also helps her make 
better decisions when she becomes CEO – for even though such knowledge may be critical for 
the CEO to function effectively, it may be much harder to acquire at the CEO level where 
vendors and customers will be far more circumspect, and the CEO’s time more limited.
7
 
  More 
specifically, at the end of any period t, the firm generates cash flows   
( ) 11 ( , , ) [ ( ) ( )]
CEO CEO
tt t t t t C k s s k fs gs
γ θ −− =+   (1.1) 
                                                                                                                                                 
and cash flows.  This is not critical; with some added notation, we can handle situations where the CEO can 
take only cash flows, not capital.   
6 Internal auditing and accounting procedures may not be necessary, because the manager is an insider who 
can observe investment first-hand.  But there has to be some way for the CEO to commit investment before 
the manager commits effort.  
7 Recent literature has called such learning “organizational capital.”  See Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) and 
Lustig, Syverson and Nieuwerburgh (2008), for example. 7 
 
where  t θ  is a measure of how favorable the business environment is at time t and γ  is a constant 
less than one.  The function  f indicates the CEO’s contribution to cash flows, and its argument, 
CEO s , is the firm-specific learning acquired by the CEO at t – 1 when he was a young manager. 
The functiong captures the manager’s contribution to cash flows, where  t s  is the learning effort 
the manager exerts at time t.  Both  f and g are increasing and concave and obey INADA 
conditions.  All agents maximize the present discounted value of their remaining lifetime income. 
The discount rate applied to next period’s cash flows is r.    
1.2. What the CEO takes 
We assume for now that the manager’s wages are normalized to zero. The CEO captures 
everything but the capital stock that he commits to leave behind, that is, he appropriates 
11 () tt t t tt C k k C k k cash flow investment −− + −=− − = − . It will be convenient to say the CEO 
determines investment, though technically he determines end-of-period capital stock.  At the end 
of every period, the current CEO retires, so he has no direct incentive to preserve firm value for 
the future.  The manager becomes the new CEO, because he is the only one with the relevant 
human capital to succeed – we will relax this assumption later.  
We assume that cash flow always covers investment, so there is no need for outside 
financing.  We consider outside financing in Section III. We now solve the model and see what it 
implies for CEO investment and managerial effort. 
1.3. First best and second best 
Inspection suggests that the first-best capital stock is    
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 =+  + 
  (1.2) 
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 where  1 ,
FB FB
tt ss +  are first best levels of learning effort.
8 FB
t s   solves 
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1
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  (1.3) 
 
Thus the first-best level of capital stock increases with the prospective quality of the business 
environment,  1 t θ + , but does not directly depend on the current business environment  t θ .   In 
contrast, the first-best level of managerial learning depends both on the current as well as the 
future business environment since it affects current as well as future cash flows.   
In the second-best case, there is no direct rationale for the current CEO to commit to 
leave behind any capital stock, because that generates cash returns only after he has retired. 
However, there is a kind of contemporaneous settling up, because the CEO’s investment affects 
the future income of the manager, and therefore the manager’s incentive to engage in learning 
effort, and in turn the firm’s cash flows today.  Start first with the CEO’s income.  It is  
  ( ) 1 11 1 ( , , ) () [ ( ) ( ) ] ()
CEO SB CEO SB
t t t tt t t t tt C ks s kk k f s g s kk




t s  is the manager’s second-best equilibrium learning.  Differentiating w.r.t.  t k , we see 
that the CEO’s marginal net return from investing is  








γ θ − ′ −   (1.5). 
This net return depends on current business conditions  t θ  and capital stock  1 t k −  because 
these determine the cash flow impact of any increase in the manager’s learning effort induced by 
CEO investment.  It also depends critically on how the manager’s optimal learning effort varies 






.  This sensitivity of effort to investment is the channel through 
                                                 
8 Formally, the first-best solves for investment and managerial learning pairs (kt, st) for all t, so as to 
maximize the discounted sum of cash flows net of investment and managerial effort, where the net cash 
flow in period t is given by Ct(kt-1 ,st-1 ,st), as  in Eq. (1.1), minus [(kt - kt-1)+ st]. 9 
 
which the CEO’s investment feeds back into contemporaneous cash flows; it will be a central 
focus in what follows.  
To see how this sensitivity is determined, first note that the manager chooses 
SB
t s to 
maximize her future rents as the CEO.  She maximizes 
( ) 1 11
1
[ ( ) ( )] ( )
1
tt t t t t t k fs gs k k s
r
γ θ + ++  + −−−  +
.        (1.6) 
Differentiating and setting the result equal to zero, we get 
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 + ′ = 


.  Since  f ′is decreasing, learning is greater if the future is discounted 
less (lower r), if the expected future environment  1 t θ + is better, and if the CEO leaves behind 
more capital stock  t k .   











  (1.8) 
 
which is positive, implying that even a myopic CEO has incentives to invest for the future in 
order to motivate his manager today.  Further specialization of functions gives illustrative closed-
form solutions and numerical examples. 
1.4.  Specializing functions.  
Assume that for the same amount of learning, the contribution of the CEO to cash flows 
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− =+   (1.9) 
Substituting  f in (1.7) and rearranging, we get 
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γ θ + +=
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  (1.10) 









γ θ + −  = +  + 
  (1.11) 
 
Given the capital stock  t k , the manager’s effort 
SB
t s  depends only on the future business 
environment and the end-of-period capital stock, even though it affects current cash flows.  This 
is because the manager does not share in current period rents.  The current environment will 
affect her effort, but only through  t k .  Substituting Eq. (1.10) in (1.9) and simplifying, we get 
















  =   +   
  (1.12) 
  
The current business environment today  t θ  and the beginning-of-period capital stock 
1 t k −  influence the end-of-period capital stock  t k , even though they have no effect on the returns 
produced by that capital stock, which are driven by  1 t θ + . The intuition is simple: end-of-period 
capital adds to the CEO’s income only by enhancing his subordinate’s learning effort today. That 
matters more for current cash flows if today’s business environment is good or if the current 
capital stock is high. Put another way, appropriating an additional dollar is more attractive for the 
CEO if today’s environment is bad, or if the firm’s capital stock is small, because the associated 
decline in effort by his employee does less absolute damage. Finally, the greater the relative 
contribution of the manager to cash flows, the greater the desire of the CEO to motivate learning 
effort by increasing investment. 
1.5. The Steady State  11 
 
   In the steady state,  1
SS
tt θ θθ + = =  and  1
SB
tt kk k − = = . Substituting in Eq. (1.12) and 
simplifying, we get 
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 
  (1.14) 




< .  Steady-state managerial 
learning and cash flows net of investment and learning effort can also be calculated using Eqs. 
(1.11) and (1.1).   
  In Figures 2a, 2b and 2c, we plot the convergence to the steady state of investment, the 
manager’s learning effort and net cash flows for two initial conditions, one with initial investment 
above the steady state and one below.  This numerical example (and the ones to follow) employ 
benchmark parameter values (1+r)
–1 = 0.95, γ = 0.2, (b-1)/b = 0.3, α = 0.5, a = 0, and θ
SS = 1. As 
the plots reveal, convergence is almost fully achieved within five CEOs’ tenures. The 
convergence rate is faster when the firm starts farther from the steady state. 
We can also determine the first-best steady state. We substitute the specific forms of 
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− −  + ++      =       +−       
  (1.15) 
 
Comparing the ratio of the second best steady state in Eq. (1.13) with the first-best steady state 





















 +  =
 + ++   
    −    
             (1.16)  
It can be shown that the ratio in Eq. (1.16) is smaller than one.  Note that (somewhat surprisingly) 
the ratio is independent of the steady-state business conditions.  Finally, as can be verified 
analytically and as also shown in Figure 3a, the ratio in square brackets tends to zero as 0 α → or 
α →∞.  In other words, second-best capital stock goes to zero when the CEO contributes 
nothing to current cash flow (α = 0) or the manager contributes nothing (α = ∞).  
 The intuition is interesting. α  represents the relative importance of the CEO in 
generating cash flows.  If α is very high, the CEO does not really need the manager’s effort, and 
hence sees little need to invest.  If α  is very low, today’s manager, who reaps the benefit of her 
effort only when she is the CEO, sees little merit in effort, because that effort will do little to 
enhance her future rents.   Thus the ratio in Eq. (1.16) is maximized at a positive, finite level of 
α .   
Turn next to the ratio of second-best to first-best cash flows, which is:   
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+  = 
+ ++    
    −    
  (1.17) 
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As with investment, the ratio is smaller than one and independent of steady-state business 
conditions.
9
We summarize the steady-state results as follows.  
  
(i)  Under stable business conditions, second-best investment, managerial learning 
and cash flows are all smaller than their first-best counterparts.   
(ii)  Second-best cash flow is maximized when the CEO’s contribution to cash flows 
is neither too large nor too small relative to the manager’s contribution.  
1.6. Some implications 
Correlation of cash flow with investment 
Internally-governed firms may naturally display a positive correlation between current 
cash flow and investment, even though there is no financing constraint thus far.  The rationale is 
as follows. Managerial effort anticipates future business conditions and also responds to the 
CEO’s current investments.  Since the CEO’s current investment is driven by the need to 
motivate effort so as to enhance current (not future) cash flows, it will be driven by current 
business conditions.  Since current business conditions drive both cash flows and investment, 
there is a correlation between the two even after controlling for future business conditions.  See 
Figure 3b, where we report coefficients from regressing investment normalized by past capital 
stock ( ) 1 / tt ik − on cash flows ( ) 1 / tt Cashflow k − and business conditions ( ) 1 t θ + .
10
This investment-cash flow sensitivity emerges not because firms are financially 
constrained (unlike Fazzari, Hubbard, and Peterson (1988)), but because of a common factor 
driving investment and cash flow.  Kaplan and Zingales (1997) suggest that many firms that have 
high investment-cash flow correlations do not actually face financial constraints. 
   
                                                 
9 From an efficiency standpoint, it is more appropriate to focus on cash flows net of investment and 
managerial effort. It turns out that in this case too, the ratio of second-best outcome to the first-best is small 
when α tends to zero or infinity (for the same reasons) and is maximized at an interior level of α (see Figure 
3a). 
10 The regression is based on draws of 500 periods around our benchmark example, where each period, the 
business condition is drawn to be a random variable that is uniformly distributed between 0.5 and 1.5.  14 
 
Temporary shocks to business conditions 
Better current business conditions increase the CEO’s incentives to invest, even though 
they have no direct influence on the future cash flows produced by the investment, because of the 
indirect effect on managerial incentives.  The current capital stock also alters investment 
incentives because it alters the value of managerial effort.  If business conditions fluctuate, 
especially in the downward direction, these linkages can lead to significant inefficiency.   
As an illustration, consider Figure 3c, where we “shock” the business condition at date t 
= 1 to θ1 = 1.5 or 0.5, compared to the steady-state value θ
SS = 1.  Even though an unexpected 
temporary shock to business conditions should not affect investment for the future, investment in 
period t = 1 moves substantially (depending on the shock), taking about four periods to revert to 
the steady-state (once business conditions revert to the steady-state starting at t = 2).  An adverse 
shock to business conditions reduces current investment (or, equivalently, increases the CEO’s 
incentive to take out cash), which then reduces the capital stock next period, and reduces 
incentives to invest next period (and also managerial effort) even though business conditions have 
returned to normal.  Thus shocks have persistence; our model suggests that recessions are likely 
to be more prolonged in economies where internal governance predominates.   
If business conditions are stable, however, the different horizons of the CEO and the 
manager could combine to disconnect cash flows and capital stock from business conditions.  
This is what we see in both Eqs. (1.16) and (1.17), where the ratio of second-best to first-best 
capital stock and cash flows do not depend on business conditions in the steady state.  
1.7. Essential aspects of the mechanism of internal governance 
We have assumed a CEO who is selfish, myopic and unconstrained by external 
governance.  The future welfare of the firm or its employees has no weight in his objective 
function.  All this can be relaxed.  We can also replace terms like “capture” or “appropriation” 
with less loaded terms like “investment distortions” or “shirking.”  None of what the CEO does 15 
 
need be illegal. In a similar vein, the “CEO” can be a stand-in for top management, while the 
“manager” could stand for critical employees. 
But our goal is to see precisely what conditions are necessary for internal governance to 
work and to see where it could be an important support to corporate performance.  Consider the 
necessary ingredients: the CEO should believe that undertaking future-oriented actions will 
increase current cash flows, and thus his welfare.  This requires key stakeholders like customers 
and employees (see Hirschman (1970), Titman (1984)) to be interested in the future, even if the 
CEO is not.  Customers are, however, typically at a distance, and leaving aside the purchase of 
high-value durable goods, are unlikely to be appropriately informed or concerned about a seller’s 
future health. 
This then leaves employees, particularly early- or mid-career managers, as the 
stakeholders most concerned, informed and able to act against short-sighted CEOs.  They can be 
a reliable part of a mechanism of internal governance only if they have a stake in the future of the 
firm. This requires some firm-specific rents, which can come from some firm-specific ability or 
costs of leaving the firm (such as the costs of moving house and kids).  The absence of such rents, 
either because external governance severely limits what employees can appropriate, or because 
employees are interchangeable across firms, would render internal governance ineffective. 
Do we need the actions (investment and effort) to be staggered?  If there are 
contemporaneous complementarities between CEO actions and managerial actions, the former 
could spur the latter.  However, for this to be effective in improving manager incentives, the CEO 
should also commit to paying the manager an appropriate share of current rents.
11
                                                 
11 We have assumed that the manager’s effort also pays off directly in the future, since it determines her 
capability as CEO.  This link is not strictly necessary.  If the manager’s effort is critical in generating the 
cash flow necessary to make the investment, then the manager’s effort could be linked to the future via 
investment.  We have not explored this link.  We thank Mark Rubinstein for suggesting it.   
  This may be 
difficult, since learning effort is hard to contract on.  Our model (also see Prendergast (1993)) 16 
 
suggests that the rewards to learning may be prospective control rents from promotion in the firm, 
which suggests a model where CEO actions, such as investment, have long term effects.   
In summary, the existence of future firm-specific rents can make employees far more 
effective in exerting internal governance.  However, they do not do this by asserting “voice” in 
Hirschman’s terminology (probably an easy way to get fired), but by reducing effort or by being 
reluctant to accept a job offer.  None of this needs any coordination on the part of employees, or 
any appeal to the board of directors or to external governance. 
II. Partnerships and efficiency 
We have fixed the manager’s reservation wage, for convenience at zero.  This assumption 
is more important than it may seem at first glance, because it gives the manager rents when she 
starts work.  The CEO would like to extract the rents by bargaining down the wage.  The CEO 
could do so if there were competition among aspiring managers with independent wealth or the 
ability to borrow, and the negative wage he imposes would essentially be the price at which he 
sells the partnership to the manager. In practice, managers are unlikely to have independent 
wealth of the requisite magnitude, while moral hazard should impede borrowing on her personal 
account against future income. Nevertheless, this is an important possibility to explore.  
Consider again the benchmark model of the private firm. Suppose we allow the CEO to 
fix the managerial wage after investment has been committed but before the managerial effort is 
incurred.  Suppose also that there is no friction in the market for personal borrowing by managers, 
so that their entire stream of future rents can be pledged.  Then, it is clear that under competitive 
labor market for managers, for any committed capital stock, the CEO can charge the manager an 
amount that sets her exactly at the reservation wage of zero.  Formally, this amount is 
( ) 1 1 1 11
1
( ) [ ( ) ( )] ( ) ( )
1
tt t t t t t t t t t wk k fs gs k k w k s
r
γ θ + + + ++  =+ − −+ −  +
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  The key question is how does this set of assumptions affect the CEO investment?  The 
CEO’s objective is now to choose investment  t k to maximize 
( ) 11 [ ( ) ( )] ( ) ( )
CEO SB
t t t t t tt k fs gs k k wk
γ θ −− + −− +  
Substituting for  t w ( t k ), we can see that the CEO’s objective takes the form of the entire present 
discounted sum of value created by the firm, which means he chooses the firm-value maximizing 
t k  given managerial response  t s ( t k ).  
  In other words, when managerial wage can be set by the CEO after investment has been 
committed and managers can borrow in an unconstrained manner against future income, the CEO 
internalizes all effects of investment choice on firm cash flows. We do not quite achieve first best 
yet because when she chooses effort, the manager still does not internalize the cash flow 
appropriated by the current CEO. Nevertheless, the agency problems of the firm are reduced to 
the moral hazard problem of managerial effort because the CEO “sells” the firm to the manager 
(see also Kreps (1990)).
12
Proposition 1:  
  The manager in turn anticipates that she will sell the firm when she is 
the CEO to the next manager at the price that internalizes all effects of that period’s investment 
choice, and so on. The firm now resembles a rolling partnership where senior partners sell the 
firm to junior partners. We summarize this discussion as follows: 
When there are no constraints on managerial ability to borrow against future rents to their 
human capital, a “partnership” model of the firm – a private firm where the CEO sells the firm to 
the manager – attains the efficient level of investments (given the moral hazard problem of 
managerial effort). 
                                                 
12 Kreps (1990) focuses on the role played by reputation in lengthening decision-making horizons of 
myopic agents. In particular, he considers a model where an overlapping set of managers co-operate, by 
mutually trusting each other, since a manager next period “buys” the reputational capital of the current 
manager and this sale incentivizes the current manager for the long run, preventing defections motivated by 
his short-termism. See also Morrison and Wilhelm (2004). 18 
 
In practice, the inability to pledge intangible human capital and the difficulty of 
borrowing against tangible assets are fundamental frictions that limit the ability of managers to 
raise money against future rents. One could think of the retiring CEO (retiring senior partners) 
accepting a promissory note from the manager (junior partners) in return for turning the firm 
over, but that would imply the CEO retains some ability to enforce claims on cash flows. But 
once we allow outsiders have some power of enforcement over cash flows, we enter the realm of 
outside financing, which we now turn to. 
     
III. External Governance 
Thus far we have modeled a firm with no need for external finance, for example an 
employee-owned cooperative or partnership, like a law or consulting firm.  This may be the only 
feasible organizational form when assets are principally human capital or intangibles like client 
relationships.  Now we assume that the firm seeks outside financing, which is feasible only if 
investors have some meaningful property rights.  That in turn requires us to assume that the firm 
invests in assets that would retain a “second best” value (that is, the value without the use of the 
CEO’s human capital) in the hands of outside investors.  We give the investors only the most 
primitive property right to intervene and take the assets, however.  This property right cannot play 
much of a role in “disciplining” the CEO. Instead it moves the firm to a better equilibrium. The 
extended framework also allows us to develop a theory of dividend policy. 
2.1. Outside Equity 
Following Fluck (1998) and Myers (2000), we give outside shareholders (or more 
generally, capital holders) only the most basic property right.
13
                                                 
13  Equity could also be raised from private investors.  We consider public corporations in order to show 
how internal governance works when outside investors have property rights but no ability to control 
operating or investment decisions or the capture of cash flow by the CEO.  Private investors could 
intervene to shape operating decisions or discourage capture, which could create hold-up problems for 
  They cannot control the CEO’s 19 
 
decisions, but at the beginning of each period t they can take over the assets of the firm, realizing 
β (01 β ≤< ) per dollar of capital stock.  It turns out thatβ  will represent the ease of raising 
outside capital, so we will term it the governance parameter. Clearly,  0 β = corresponds to the 
private firm case we analyzed thus far. If the CEO can make a commitment (see below) that 
satisfies the shareholders, they go away and return one period later, when they can threaten the 
assets available at that time once again. Shareholders have no control over any decisions the CEO 
makes in between. 
 As before, the CEO can make a commitment at the beginning of the period to make a 
portion of the cash flows and the end-of-period capital stock verifiable. Now, though, the CEO 
makes two other choices.  First, the CEO can use the verifiable cash flows not only to commit to 
end-of-period capital stock but also to pay a dividend  t d .  Second, the CEO can issue additional 
equity with proceeds of  t x .We assume the CEO sets each amount separately and optimally, 
though with mild assumptions, all that matters is the total amount the CEO leaves behind for 
investment and to pay the net dividend  tt dx − .  
We first analyze the dividend, seasoned equity offering (SEO) and investment decisions 
of a public going concern (that is, subsequent to an initial public offering (IPO)). Then we 
analyze the CEO’s decisions and the value of the firm at IPO.  Finally we consider whether 
outside equity can bring the firm closer to first-best investment and effort decisions. 
The time line for a public going concern is given in Figure 4. 
Figure 4: Model timeline with outside equity 
Period t                                Period t+1… 

















                                                                                                                                                 
junior managers. The relative efficiency of public vs. private equity is an intriguing topic for further 
research.  So is the choice between debt and equity. 20 
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2.2. Investment, SEO and Payout  
We require, without loss of generality,  t d  ≥ 0 and  t x  ≥ 0.  The net dividend  tt dx − could 
however be negative. Given the net dividend, the CEO’s  effective investment in the project is 
1 ( )( ) tt tt kk dx − − +−, which is smaller than the new investment  1 () tt kk − − whenever the net 
dividend is negative. The ability to issue equity thus allows the CEO to invest with “other 
people’s money”, reducing the private costs incurred in making investments. 
Further, when the CEO invests capital, he not only gives the manager a stronger incentive 
for effort; he also gives outside shareholders a larger claim on next period’s cash flows. A part of 
this larger claim will be reduced by the amount that has to be promised to new shareholders to 
bring them on board. Therefore, the additional future claim on assets available to existing 
shareholders is  ( ) 1 tt t kk x β − −− and they also receive a cash dividend of  t d . This total payoff to 
existing shareholders must exceed their required reservation payoff of rβ 1 t k − . 
Also, the overall capital claim that is created,β t k , reduces the manager’s payoff next 
period when she becomes CEO as a higher reservation payoff needs to be offered to shareholders.  
We will therefore need to check whether the manager’s participation constraint is met.  From all 
this we will derive a theory of dividend policy. 
The CEO’s maximization problem is thus given by 
  ( ) 11 , 0, 0 max [ ( ) ( )] ( ) ( )
tt t
CEO
tt t t t t t kx d k fs gs k k d x
γ θ −− ≥≥ + −− −−,      (1.18)
  11 .. ( ) ( ) tt tt t st k k d x r k ββ −− − +−≥           (1.19)21 
 
 
( ) ( ) 1 1 1 11
ˆ
1 ˆˆ arg max [ ( ) ( )] ( ) ( )
1 t
t tt t t t t t t t
s
s k fs gs k k d x s
r
γ θ + + + ++  ∈ + − −− − −  +
 (1.20)
( ) ( ) 1 1 1 11
1
( ) [ ( ) ( )] ( ) 0
1
t tt t t t t t t t and U k k f s g s k k x d s
r
γ θ + + + ++  =+ − − + − −≥  +
  (1.21)  
As can be seen readily, what matters in the CEO’s problem is only the net dividend 
tt dx − . Let  1 λ  and  2 λ be the Lagrangian multipliers for the net dividend constraint Eq. (1.19) 
and for the manager’s participation constraint Eq. (1.21). The CEO’s first order condition w.r.t. 
the net dividend is  1 1 λ −+ and w.r.t.  t k is:               







γ θ βλ λ − ′′ −+ +   (1.22) 
 
Complementary slackness requires that   
  11 1 [( )( ) ] 0 tt tt t k k d x rk λβ β −− − +−− =   (1.23) 
 
  2 () 0 t Uk λ =   (1.24) 
 
Now we describe what this means for the net dividend policy and investment. To start 
with, let the manager’s participation constraint, Eq.  (1.21), be satisfied with slack so that 2 0 λ =  
from Eq. (1.24). Note that it is optimal for the CEO to set  11 [( ) ] 0 tt tt t k k x d rk ββ −− − −+− = in 
Eq. (1.23), whereby 1 1 λ = . The capital investment raises shareholders’ ability to extract and 
could potentially give shareholders more than their minimum required rate of return, so the CEO 
can offset this by reducing his effective investment through a negative net dividend. In other 
words, the net dividend is given by 
  11 ( ). tt t tt d x rk k k ββ −− −= − −   (1.25) 
 
In general, there is indeterminacy between the size of cash dividend and the size of SEO. 
A plausible way to break the indeterminacy is to assume some small transactions costs of 22 
 
issuance. This would imply that when the net dividend is negative, the CEO issues equity equal to 
the magnitude of the net dividend and makes no dividend payment, but when it is positive, he 
only makes dividend payments equal to the amount of new dividends. The CEO’s cost of 
investing is his co-investment (the share of the investment he pays out of cash flows because 
capital cannot be fully pledged out and 1 β < ) plus the “rental” payment for employing capital, 
that is,  1 ( )( ) tt tt kk dx − − +−=  1 (1 )( ) tt kk β − −− + 1 t rk β − . 
  This means that the return for the CEO from satisfying the dividend constraint by 







γ θβ − ′ −+ , which beats the return for the CEO from the case 
without outside equity ( 0 β = ). So the CEO invests more in the presence of outside equity than 
he would in its absence, even though he still has no direct stake in the future. It can be verified 
that the equations determining investment and managerial effort are given as follows, with the 
only the first-order condition for CEO’s choice of investment differing from the earlier case of 
the firm with no external claims :   







γ θβ − = −   (1.26)   
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For simplicity, we continue to denote the solutions for investment and managerial effort 
as 
SB
t k and 
SB
t s , respectively, and suppress the dependence on external governance parameter β . 
Note that in the limiting case when 1 β = , CEO does not need to sacrifice any current cash flows 
to make the investment (it can be fully financed from outside) and the first-order condition 
implies that he chooses an unboundedly high level of investment.  This, however, would violate 
the manager’s participation constraint. Let us turn to that now. 
Manager’s Participation Constraint 23 
 
  Thus far, we have assumed the manager’s participation constraint is met. Substituting for 
the net dividend condition 11 1 [ ( )] tt t tt d x rk k k ββ ++ + −= − −  in Eq. (1.21) and differentiating 





( ) ( ) ( ) (1 )
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t tt t t U k k fs gs r
r
γ θγ β β
−
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                   (1.27) 
where the derivatives with respect to  1 t k + and  1 t s + drop out due to the Envelope Theorem. The 
term in the square brackets in (1.27), which is the cash return on investment next period plus the 






because the required future co-investment can increase with investment this period. For example, 
when β =1, next period’s CEO has to pay r out of cash flows for every additional dollar invested 
today. Put differently, a higher capital stock means that today’s manager puts in more effort, but 
she also has to pay shareholders more next period when she becomes CEO. If the cash return on 
investment is sufficiently low, the manager’s utility can be reduced by increased investment. This 
should be contrasted with the last section, where we had no outside equity (and hence no negative 






, the term in the square brackets in (1.27) is always positive and 
the participation constraint is never hit. Intuitively, with weak governance, the manager’s co-
investment as CEO next period falls with an increase in capital stock at the end of this period, 
unlike in the above case with strong governance. For example, when β  approaches zero, the 
CEO next period has to pay shareholders virtually nothing, and any additional investment today 
only reduces what she needs to invest out of cash flows to meet a target capital stock at the end of 
that period. Thus the rents to next period’s CEO always increase with today’s investment. 24 
 





and well behaved functional form for U (as we elaborate below), the manager’s 
expected rents  () Ukfirst increase in k and then decrease as diminishing marginal returns set in. 
This implies that  () 0 Uk ′ <  when  () 0 Uk≤ . In particular, as  1 β → , we have that k →∞in 
this very period,  () 0 Uk ′ < and therefore the constraint that  () 0 Uk≥  must be violated for a 
sufficiently high k . Consider, therefore, β  sufficiently high such that  ˆ ( )0
SB
t Uk < . Let the first 
period where this happens be ˆ t .  Let 
* k be such that in steady state (with capital stock remaining 
unchanging in the future) we have 
* ()0 Uk = . The CEO cannot set capital any higher than 
* k for 
fear of violating the manager’s participation constraint, and will have to meet equity’s rate of 
return constraint by setting the net dividend to be 
*
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ 11 () tt t t d x rk k k ββ −− −= − − .  Otherwise, 
the CEO could make the manager worse off by investing more capital (even though he still 
increases her marginal incentive to exert effort), because he increases the capacity of outside 
equity to extract value by more than he increases the capacity of the manager to generate cash as 
CEO next period.  
This means from date  ˆ t onwards, the need to ensure the manager’s participation 
constraint will mean capital is steady at 
* k and the net dividend will be positive and equal to 
* ** * () tt d x rk k k rk ββ β −= − − = .  
  We state all this as a formal result below. Assume that the manager has a well-behaved 
expected utility function (
0 lim ( ) 0
k Uk
→ > , lim ( ) 0
k Uk
→∞ < ,  () 0 Uk ′′ < , and  () 0 Uk ′ < for some k). 
When the business environment is constant, we have 
Proposition 2: A public firm with an initial capital  0 k , outside equity financing, and external 
governance parameterβ  is characterized as follows: 25 
 
The capital stock, 
SB
t k ,  and managerial effort,
SB
t s , before the firm reaches the steady state are 















(i)  The capital stock, 
SB
t k ,  and managerial effort,
SB
t s , are both increasing in the external 
governance parameter β . 







such that if and only if 
* ββ > , does the 
firm reach the steady state in which the equilibrium utility for all future CEOs is zero 
(they are at their participation constraint and earn no rents net of effort). In 
particular, the steady state is hit in the first period  ˆ t when   ˆ
SB
t k >
* k and 
* k is such 
that
* ()0 Uk = .  
a.  The steady state capital stock is 
* k  in period ˆ t  and after, and the steady state 
dividend is 
** d rk β =  in period ˆ 1 t +  and after. 
b.  In period ˆ t , the net dividend (dividend net of SEOs) is   
ˆˆ 11
* [ ( )]
tt
SB SB rk k k ββ
−− −−which is a cash dividend if positive and an equity 
issuance if negative.  
c.  The rate of convergence to steady state is increasing in external governance, that 
is,  ˆ t is (weakly) decreasing inβ . 
(iii)  The net dividend before steady state is reached is
11 [ ( )]
t tt
SB SB SB rk k k ββ
−− −−  which is a 
cash dividend if positive and an equity issuance if negative. 
Proof:  As explained in the text and omitted. Details available on request. 
  The proposition then suggests the life cycle pattern of net dividend payments and 
investment that is empirically observed. In the early stages of a firm’s life cycle, when  t k is low, 26 
 
capital investment will grow at a rate greater than (1+r). In these cases, the firm’s net dividend 
payment is negative, that is, it raises further financing from the external markets rather than 
paying out a cash dividend. As the firm becomes more mature and rates of return fall, the net 
dividend becomes less negative -- the size of the SEO falls and eventually ceases as the firm 
starts paying positive dividends. Finally, when capital stock is so high (and return on capital is so 
low) that investing more would de-motivate the manager as it violates her participation constraint, 
the CEO will stop investing further, the capital stock will stabilize, future CEOs will also all be at 
their participation constraint, and the firm will make a steady cash dividend payout to investors. 
Now we need to determine the size of the first capital issuance, that is, the IPO stage. 
 
3.2 Initial Public Offering  
Let us see what happens earlier, when the CEO takes the firm public through an initial 
public offering (IPO) in periodτ . In keeping with the spirit of our analysis, the CEO appropriates 
the proceeds from the offering entirely. The CEO chooses investment kτ to maximize 
  ( ) 11 [( ) () ]( )
CEO k fs gs k k k
γ
τ τ ττ τ θβ −− + −− +   (1.28) 
 
since external governance allows outside shareholders to get value equal to share β of the capital 
stock next period.  Now, the first-order condition for the CEO’s investment is given by  







θβ − ′ −+   (1.29) 
 
Hence, as in the case of the ongoing concern, the CEO at the time of IPO also has a greater 
incentive to invest (for any initial level of capital stock) compared to the second-best in absence 
of equity. This is because a higher end-of-period capital stock also increases the proceeds he gets 
from the IPO. In a sense then, the ability to “sell” the firm lengthens the CEO’s horizon and gives 
him the incentive to invest more.  27 
 
We summarize this discussion in the following proposition: 
Proposition 3: Once a firm with external governance parameterβ (such that 0 β > ) goes public, 
its capital stock before reaching steady state is always higher than that of the firm without  
outside equity.  
Proof:  Omitted. 
IPO, Ongoing Concern and Investment Growth: An example  
Let us go back to our example where  
1 1
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as  t k →∞. Furthermore, 
()0 t Uk ′′ < .  Finally, in steady state, 
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follows that () t Uk first increases from a positive number, then falls below zero, crossing zero at 
a single point. We can then map out dividend policy and investment for any set of parameters.  
Let  the CEO decides to take the private firm public at τ =10, after it has reached (its 
private firm) steady state. In its private steady state,  1 kτ − = 0.0108. We consider two values of the 
governance parameter:  0.5 β = and  0.9999 β = (to approximate the limiting case with full 
ability of the firm to pledge assets to outside financiers). Figure 5a shows that when  0.5 β = , in 28 
 
the period of the IPO, investment grows almost four-fold to 10
IPO k = 0.041. And then within six 
more periods, it converges to a steady-state value of 0.057.  Clearly, the IPO has boosted 
investment substantially (and also managerial effort). The CEO would have little incentive to set 
this level of capital stock, were it not for the added incentive coming from the extra equity value 
he can raise through the IPO if he raises investment. Figure 5b shows that this effect is especially 
powerful as external governance improves.  When 0.9999 β = , the investment in the IPO phase 
itself grows multifold to 106.31, reaching its steady-state value in just one period of 337.62. 
It is interesting to also examine the dividend policy of the firm post IPO. Figures 5c and 
5d illustrate that when the firm is in the “growth phase”, net dividend is negative as the firm is 
investing capital at a fast pace. Eventually, once the firm reaches the steady state, net dividend 
becomes positive.  No further capital issuance is needed and the firm starts paying out a cash 
dividend.  This dividend policy mirrors well the life-cycle of equity issuance and dividends 
observed for young firms that do an IPO and eventually reach their mature phase.  
Finally, what is the current manager’s utility over these growth phases and as a function 
of the external governance? Figure 5e plots this utility net of the effort incurred in learning as a 
manager. At the IPO stage and in the initial growth phase, this net utility (U(k)) rises steadily.  
Consistent with Proposition 2, when the external governance is relatively weak, the net utility 
converges to a positive steady-state value.  In other words, managers are able to extract rents in 
equilibrium since capital stock never grows that large.  While this is beneficial for managers, it 
leads to lower investments. In contrast, when the external governance is relatively strong, the 
manager’s net utility rises sharply in the IPO period but then declines rapidly once capital grows 
to a level where diminishing returns to scale kick in. Once the utility reaches the reservation level 
of zero, each current CEO cannot grow capital any further (Figure 5b) without violating his 
manager’s participation constraint (Figure 5e) and thus is forced to pay outside equity in the form 29 
 
of cash dividends (Figure 5d). The firm thus switches from its extraordinary growth phase to 
steady-state capital with stable cash dividends.  
3.3. Discussion 
How do Internal Governance and External Governance Interact 
  We have earlier considered the case of only internal governance. Relative to that, the IPO 
expands investment and managerial effort for two reasons. First, the IPO changes the CEO’s 
investment incentives in the period of the IPO. (We do not model when the CEO decides to 
undertake the IPO, though this is an interesting extension). But the boost to capital stock given by 
the IPO would not be enough for sustained growth, for in the absence of outside equity, both 
capital stock and effort would subsequently decline to the steady state. Outside equity prevents 
such a decline: Subsequent CEOs are required to compensate outside equity, but allowed to defer 
payment by building additional capital stock. This immediately alters the investment incentives of 
future CEOs, ensuring also that managerial effort remains high. As a result, the IPO potentially 
moves the firm to a better equilibrium. 
  What if we only had external governance? Clearly, the CEO would have no reason to 
invest for the future. He would be willing to commit to leaving behind only so much cash as to 
pay shareholders their opportunity cost, that is,  1 (1 ) t rk β − + . The CEO is better off liquidating 
and paying out β dollars in cash rather than leaving a dollar of capital stock behind. A dollar of 
capital stock is worth only β dollars to outside shareholders but costs the CEO a dollar to retain. 
So the CEO would always want to liquidate. 
   Without internal governance, the outside shareholders would have to worry a lot more 
about their property rights to the firm's assets, because they can't piggyback on monitoring by the 
manager. The worry increases as the CEO starts to liquidate, because it's easier to tunnel cash 
than hard assets. Thus the CEO is motivated to turn assets into cash, regardless of whether the 30 
 
cash is paid out or tunneled out. So our model indicates that internal governance is needed for the 
firm to last beyond the current period, when CEOs are myopic and rapacious. 
No Secondary Issues 
An interesting special case is one where the CEO can take the firm public but there are no 
subsequent secondary issues. If the pace of initial growth in capital stock is high, the effective 
return on book equity can be higher than r  -- because the CEO cannot “dilute” the greater power 
he bequeaths to equity with the higher capital stock by making secondary equity issuances. 
Moreover, even when the rate of growth of capital stock would naturally fall below r , the CEO 
will choose to set it at r because he would always prefer to pay the external financiers “in kind” 
by committing to leave behind more capital than in cash. As earlier, cash dividends would be paid 
out only once the capital stock becomes so large that the managerial participation constraint 
becomes binding.  
Interestingly though, in absence of SEOs, the value of equity can reflect the future growth 
in the capital stock (which would otherwise be diluted through future secondary share issuances). 
In turn, at the time of IPO, potentially greater equity can be raised and the CEO may invest more. 
This is because his co-investment is reduced by the greater equity proceeds. It is an interesting 
question whether a public firm that protects initial equity providers by ruling out SEOs (through 
CEO’s incentive compensation and governance) does better in the long run compared to a public 
firm that allows such dilution. We leave this for future research. 
Outside Equity Owned Firms and Rents 
   Interestingly, in the steady state for the public firm, the CEO gets no rent in that his 
participation constraint is just met – he appropriates just enough, after paying the required 
dividend, to compensate for his effort as manager in the previous period. But because he can 
appropriate all the cash flows at the margin, he has the maximum possible incentive to exercise 
effort. The firm cannot give him a better incentive scheme based on cash compensation.  31 
 
  The reason why rents are reduced to zero, despite a succession of rapacious CEOs, is 
interesting. Each CEO cares only about his take, and about the manager only to the extent that it 
impacts managerial effort. By raising capital stock, the CEO raises managerial effort but also the 
capacity of shareholders to extract their return. Eventually, the rents of the future CEO will fall 
with more investment, even as the manager’s effort keeps increasing, but the current CEO is not 
concerned – he is doing to his successor only what his predecessor did to him. The self interest of 
each CEO works on behalf of outside shareholders and ensures that future managerial rents are 
driven to zero. All this happens in a setting where outside shareholders have no way of affecting 
operating or investment decisions, and no direct way to limit the capture of cash flow by the 
CEO.  
Public Firms and Private Partnerships 
   In a public firm, the CEO’s ability to pledge the cash flow generated by future 
generations of managers to outside capital gives him the incentive to invest more. Essentially, 
through an equity issue, the CEO forces future generations of managers to pay for the investment 
he makes. It can be shown that the steady state level of capital stock can be greater or less than 
the first best level, given managerial effort. But it certainly is greater than the level in a private 
firm where the CEO cannot sell the firm to his manager. 
  In a private firm with a manager who is not wealth constrained, the CEO sells the firm to 
the manager directly, As we have seen, the CEO invests at the first best level (given effort) 
because the CEO internalizes the entire stream of future cash flows generated by the firm, not just 
the portion that can be pledged outside. 
  So given managerial effort, a private firm, where the manager buys the firm from the 
CEO and sells it in turn to her manager when she retires would be better than a public firm under 
the same circumstances. Of course, when the manager in a private firm is wealth constrained, the 
public firm can produce far greater value than the private firm despite the additional distortions it 
introduces.  32 
 
This then suggests that in human capital intensive industries where managers account for 
a substantial portion of value added and thus get a high wage, they are likely to have the wealth to 
buy the firm from the CEO. The typical firm will be structured as a rolling partnership. In capital 
intensive industries where much of the value added comes from capital, the manager’s relatively 
lower wage will make it harder for her to buy the firm. Public firms will be the norm. This 
suggests an additional rationale for the association of public firms with capital intensive sectors – 
it is not just that capital intensive firms give outsiders a greater set of control rights, it is also that 
they are harder to sell to internal owners.  
Founders, Stock Markets, and Incentives to Innovate 
  Finally, when public markets exist with good governance (high β ), the founding CEO 
can appropriate a substantial portion of the cash flows generated over time by generations of 
future CEOs by undertaking an initial public offering. This then gives him strong incentives to 
bring together the source of the firm’s rents – patents, processes, or people. Thus, the difference 
in wealth between innovative entrepreneurs and professional managers is substantial. By contrast, 
when public markets have poor governance, future CEOs appropriate a significant portion of 
future cash flows, investment ramps up slowly, and the founding CEO has lower incentives to 
innovate. The difference in wealth between innovative entrepreneurs and professional managers 
is now smaller. 
IV. Relationship to literature 
Our model resembles Fama (1980) where concerns about the adverse reputational 
consequences of misappropriation on his post-retirement career keep the CEO on the straight and 
narrow. In contrast to the ex-post settling up in that model, the settling up in our model is 
contemporaneous and by parties whose interests are intimately involved – employees 
endogenously penalize excessive misappropriation. The difference is important, for instance, in 
explaining the effects of external finance (Section 3).  33 
 
We are, of course, not the first to analyze the phenomenon of internal governance. Fama 
and Jensen (1983 a, b) as well as Hansmann (1996) refer to mutual or internal monitoring, though 
they do not undertake a detailed analysis. Landier, Sraer, and Thesmar (2006) appeal to the 
independence of top executives (as measured by their having preceded the CEO into the firm). 
Instead, we rely on their self interest - the fact that they typically have career concerns inside the 
firm. The mechanism through which they have impact is not through coordinated action or   
through appeal to a Board, but through their propensity to get de-motivated. This is neither exit 
nor voice, in the felicitous terminology of Hirschman (1970), nor active whistle-blowing as in 
Dyck, Morse and Zingales (2007), but an uncoordinated, even implicit, strike.  
Allen and Gale (2000, Chapter 12) also consider a model with overlapping generations of 
short-term CEO and managers vying for the CEO role next period. Allen and Gale assume 
complementarities between the CEO and managers in cash flow production, which gives the CEO 
the need to elicit co-operation and lengthens the effective horizon of decision-making. They 
explain based on the model the relative merits of the “stakeholder”-focus of governance of 
Japanese firms at one extreme and  the “shareholder”-focus of Anglo-Saxon firms at the other 
extreme, with French and German firms somewhere in between.
14
Similar to Allen and Gale (2000), Landier, Sraer, and Thesmar (2008) focus on situations 
where CEO and manager actions are complementary, and examine the role of optimal dissent in 
an organization. Intuitively, it is easier for a CEO to persuade the manager to follow him down 
the wrong path when they have similar private preferences over projects. Managers with different 
preferences would place greater constraints on the CEO, but at the cost of them being less 
enthusiastic when the CEO’s project choice correctly accords with his own preferences.  
  
                                                 
14 Allen, Carletti and Marquez (2007) explore a related theme and study the effect of stakeholder capitalism 
in a setting where firms’ concerns about employees and suppliers soften competition in product markets 
and enhance shareholder value.  
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Finally, implicit in our framework is a theory of the firm and its boundaries. In our view, 
the firm is an agglomeration of assets and specialized human capital which give it unique 
capabilities (see, for example, Penrose (1959), Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore 
(1990), and Rajan and Zingales (1998, 2001)). The literature suggests the ability to control access 
to the rents the firm generates is top management’s source of control. In this paper, we focus on 
the “bottom-up” influence over firm actions, exercised by those who have access but do not yet 
have explicit control, because of their ability to affect the firm’s rents. 
V. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
  Our model is simple, perhaps even overly so. Top management is both myopic and self 
interested. Yet, considerable value is preserved in the organization because of the need for top 
management to motivate younger managers. 
  Our model suggests why it may be so hard for firms to shrink gracefully, and why it may 
make sense for a firm (like Philip Morris) in a mature, declining, industry like tobacco to 
diversify into a growing industry like food (by acquiring Kraft). If the firm were to stay in the 
declining industry, it would either have to overinvest or see a collapse of incentives, and worse, a 
collapse of the discipline imposed by internal governance. Rather than see the value destruction 
associated with such a decline, the second best option might be to “morph” into a new business. 
What might be thought of as empire building by top management may just be a reaction to 
pressure from below. Indeed, Gort, Grabowski and McGukin (1985) find that unfavorable 
expectations of marginal returns to investment in existing businesses are an important spur to 
diversification, a finding consistent with the implications of our model (but also with others).  
 The breakdown of internal governance may also explain the increasing evidence of 
agency problems in financial firms in the ongoing crisis. When capital is relatively scarce and 
allocated based on detailed information available only within a firm, employees of financial firms 
are relatively immobile. Each one cares about the longer term future of their own firm, and has an 35 
 
incentive to monitor the actions of both colleagues and superiors. As capital becomes more 
widely available, though, employees become more mobile, and care less about the long term 
future of their firm. The internal pressure to worry about the long term becomes weaker.   
  Finally, our paper suggests a rich interaction between the internal structure of firms, the 
strength of internal governance, and the need for any external governance. Internal governance 
may be quite effective in growing firms with young staff, where human capital is firm specific. 
By contrast, external governance may be much more important in mature firms in declining 
industries with aging staff where the required management skills are fairly generic. Countries like 
Japan that have had a rapid demographic transition may also have suffered as their old system of 
internal governance becomes less effective in a newer environment.  
More generally, there is a rich vein of research to be mined in seeing the linkages 
between the internal organization of firms, internal governance, and external financing and 
governance. We have just touched the surface in this paper. More research clearly needs to be 
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Figure 2a: Convergence of investment in second-best 
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Figure 2b: Convergence of managerial learning in 
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